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Introduction 
In developing an individual perspective to explain learning in socio-spatial context, Rutten 
proposes that we should drop the notion of tacit knowledge which has been central to the 
literature on learning and innovation, notably the debate about spatiality.  Rutten argues that 
the contemporary literature on knowledge and organizational learning has stretched Polanyi’s 
notion of tacit knowledge too far from its original focus on the individual/cognitive realm by 
giving excessive emphasis to the collective/social aspect to the extent that tacit knowledge 
becomes indistinguishable from social context. Additionally, he raises two further objections 
to the tacit knowledge literature: its ambiguity on what constitutes social context and its lack 
of clarity about the agent of learning.   While the ‘individual-first’ perspective proposed by 
Rutten sheds light on the fluidity and multiplicity of social contexts in which individual 
learning takes place, his proposed omission of the tacit knowledge concept undermines the 
individual agency argument which is at the heart of his proposition. In this response, I shall 
make three key points to complement Rutten’s insightful analysis. Firstly, I argue that the 
notion of tacit knowledge highlights personal agency with regard to learning and therefore an 
individual perspective on learning and innovation must consider the tacitness of knowledge 
as its conceptual starting point. Secondly, I challenge Rutten’s ambiguous definition of the 
concept of ‘social context’ and seek to clarify his ‘embedded agency’ argument.  And thirdly, 
I highlight the critical role of individual mobility in creating and sustaining overlapping 
social contexts and driving the socio-spatial dynamics of learning in a global knowledge 
economy.  In what follows, I shall briefly elaborate these points. 
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Tacit knowledge and individuals as principal agents of learning 
Tacit knowledge is the necessary component of all knowledge (Tsoukas, 1996).  Rutten’s 
attempt to formulate a theory of individual learning in its socio-spatial context by dropping 
this concept is in danger of throwing out the baby with the bath water. In contrast to Rutten’s 
view that the tacit knowledge literature is ambiguous about the agent of learning and the 
meaning of social context, I argue that the concept of tacit knowledge itself denotes with 
great clarity the dynamic relationship between the individual as knowing agent and the 
relational context in which such knowing arises. Tacit knowledge has two dimensions: the 
cognitive and the social. The cognitive dimension arises from its experiential nature as 
depicted in Michael Polanyi’s (1966) observation: ‘we know more than we can tell’. Here, 
Polanyi draws our attention to the deeply personal and action-based nature of knowledge that 
defies easy articulation and communication. Tacit knowledge, in this sense, is a form of 
‘knowing’ that is inseparable from action because it is constituted through action 
(Orlikowski, 2002). As such, tacit knowledge cannot be communicated, understood or used 
without the knowing subject -- the ‘individual knower’ is the principal agent of knowledge 
creation and application.  
However, one cannot fully understand the nature of the tacit knowledge without considering 
the social context which enables the process of knowing.  Social cognitive theorists (e.g. 
Vygotsky, 1978; Reber, 1993) argue that individuals acquire their cognitive abilities and 
inner experiences by internalizing the meanings and patterns of thoughts current in their 
culture and society. Much of an individual’s tacit knowledge can be associated with their 
social and collective identity.  Durkheim’s (1964) notion of ‘collective consciousness’ 
suggests that social entities cognize and learn only to the extent that the individuals, who 
make up the social entity, are socially defined beings. The notion of ‘community of practice’ 
(CoP) stresses the importance of the social locus and shared practices within which learning 
and knowledge creation take place (Brown and Duguid, 1991; Wenger, 1998).  Transferring 
knowledge to newcomers, according to the CoP perspective, involves transferring not only 
the body of codified knowledge but also the tacitly shared ground rules and cognitive 
schemes for interpreting and decoding the meaning of that knowledge (Duguid, 2005). 
Tacitness, in this sense, is not simply a feature of the knowledge itself associated with non-
codifiability and cognitive ambiguity, it is also a relational feature inherent in the process of 
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knowing because ‘common sense thinking’ and shared assumptions that enable joint action 
are taken-for-granted by the social actors and remain unspoken (Schutz, 1953). 
Learning is therefore rooted in what Giddens (1984) calls the ‘knowledgeability’ of actors 
who know tacitly about how to ‘go on’ in the context of social life (Duguid, 2005).  Taking 
the tacitness of knowledge as a starting point leads to the logical conclusion that individuals 
are the principal agents of learning and it is their ‘knowledgeability’ that drives the dynamic 
interplay between individual and collective learning.  
 
Social context and learning: embedded agency  
Individuals are the principal agents of learning but learning is socially embedded.  Rutten’s 
attempt to direct our analytical focus towards the individual and shed light on their agentic 
motivation and behaviour is laudable, given the collective bias of the literature on learning 
and innovation. He draws on Granovetter’s (1985) notion of ‘embeddedness’ to explain the 
relationship between social context and individual agency with regard to learning. However, 
his reading of Granovetter’s (1985) concept of embeddedness  is ‘undersocialized’:  he gives 
inadequate attention to the structural properties of social context and does not account for 
how the properties of a social system of relationships influence individual relations and 
learning.  By implicitly restricting ‘social context’ to a single type of network that builds on 
individuals’ professional relations, Rutten appears to have abstracted his discussion of social 
networks out of their wider social context (socio-economic structures  and institutional 
environments).  By doing so, he prejudges the relationship between context and individual 
agency and therefore the explanatory framework developed in the paper is partial and 
ambiguous.  One major problem with Rutten’s proposition lies in the lack of clarity in his 
conceptualization of ‘professional’ and ‘social’ networks.   The argument that ‘social context 
pertains to both professional and social networks’ is ambiguous.  Does the term ‘professional 
networks’ refer to individuals’ networks of relations formed around work-related contacts or 
is it used as a collective term to denote loosely coupled professional networks cutting across 
organizations as opposed to more tightly-knitted organizational-based networks?  In either 
case, the definition of social context is too restrictive. Or is the term ‘social and professional 
networks’ meant to be all encompassing, including both ‘professional’ and ‘all other kinds’ of 
social networks (e.g. organizational, ethnic and regional)? In this case, the definition is far too 
4 
 
general and therefore is of limited value in explaining the relationship between social context 
and individual agency in learning.  
It might be useful to conceive the networks of relations governing learning as ‘social 
containers’ which vary in their ‘boundaries’ (range) and ‘relational embeddedness’ 
(cohesion) and hence in the variety of knowledge resources and cognitive autonomy accorded 
to individuals.  An agentic perspective calls for a clear explanation of how these two 
dimensions affect individuals’ agentic capacity (i.e. ability to learn) and motivation 
(willingness to learn). For example, one can make a distinction between social containers 
based on firm-centred organizational communities and those based on 
occupational/professional networks. Organizational communities are best exemplified by the 
knowledge creating companies described in the work of Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) and the 
‘J-form’ organization in the taxonomy of Lam (2000). They relate to a socially cohesive and 
highly bounded community characterised by strong relational embeddedness which 
maximizes social control over individuality.  This type of social container is also immensely 
‘local’ both in relational and spatial terms.  Individuals within organizational communities 
are strongly motivated to share and diffuse tacit knowledge through socialization but may 
have limited capacity to create radically new (tacit) knowledge due to the strong convergence 
of competence and experience inside the community. The deep penetration of communcal 
background knowledge and shared cognitive schemas into individuals’ patterns of thought 
and action constrains the scope for personal agency. By contrast, occupational/professional 
networks are more loosely coupled knowledge collectivities built on a common professional 
practice which transcends organizational and geographical boundaries.  Adhocracies 
(Mintzberg, 1979) and project networks prevalent in creative cultural industries are heavily 
reliant on this type of professional network. The knowledge base of professional networks is 
dispersed and fluid, and individuals are coordinated through common training and 
professional goals.  The boundary of this type of social container is permeable in part because 
of individual mobility across organizational and geographical boundaries. Professional 
networks therefore may have a global reach but encompass many local communities of 
practice. Individuals are able to acquire a diversity of knowledge resources through their 
connectivity with distant professional peers and re-embed them in their local communities. 
Rutten’s analysis seems to be heavily biased towards this type of fluid social container in 
which individual experts enjoy a much higher degree of autonomy than their counterparts in 
organizational communities. 
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The above stylized comparison shows that the social context in which individual learning 
takes place can be analysed at various levels (e.g. organizational, occupational, regional, 
national and transnational) and its properties vary between industries with different 
knowledge bases and institutional environments (Ashiem et al., 2007; Lam, 2002). It also 
suggests that an agentic (individual-first) perspective for understanding learning in social 
context will need to explain how the structural and relational properties of the social context 
affect individuals’ agentic capacity and their motivation. Here, Rutten is surely right to direct 
our attention to the concepts of ‘ability’ and ‘willingness’ (Reagan and McEvily, 2003), and 
to stress the critical role of individuals in driving knowledge creation and sharing in multiple 
and overlapping social contexts. His proposed focus on individuals’ network connectivity and 
behavioural orientations with regard to learning opens up the possibility for explaining the 
dynamic interplay between context and individual learning.  However, I have reservations 
about his interpretation of the role played by networks. His view that open professional 
networks will more generously equip individuals with the ability and willingness to learn 
than closed social contexts does not take into account the distinct effects of network range 
and cohesion.  Reagans and McEvily (2003) and other authors (e.g. Uzzi, 1997; Minbaeva 
and Michailova, 2004) have shown that network range (openness) enhances individuals’ 
ability to learn and transfer knowledge whereas network cohesion (closure) facilitates their 
willingness and motivation to share knowledge. This is because increased network range 
exposes individuals to diverse perspectives and knowledge sources which broaden their 
cognitive frameworks and strengthen their capacity to learn and teach; whereas increased 
cohesion engenders trust and emotional engagement which enhances willingness/motivation 
to share knowledge.  Intrinsic motivation is notably important for the sharing of tacit 
knowledge (Osterloh, 2006) which also explains why strong ties facilitate the motivation to 
transfer tacit knowledge (Hansen, 2002).  There is often a trade-off between range and 
cohesion. Overlapping social space may help to resolve this tension by enabling knowledge 
brokers to flourish (Wenger, 1998; Hargadon, 2002). These individuals are capable of 
embedding themselves in multiple social contexts whilst also motivated to engage locally. By 
recognizing the factors behind this trade-off, one could inject a stronger agentic component 
into the individual-first perspective proposed by Rutten. 
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The spatial dimension: local knowledge nodes and global networks 
The individual-first perspective proposed by Rutten has gone some way towards reconciling 
the theoretical extremes of the Territorial Innovation Model (TIM) which focuses on local 
spatial stickiness and the Communities of Practice (CoP) view which stresses global 
relational stretch.  In particular, Rutten argues that it is the ‘overlapping’ of spatially sticky 
social contexts with global social contexts and the ‘shifting’ of individuals between them that 
connects local places with global spaces. However, it remains unclear how the overlapping 
and shifting occur in the first place and what sustains them. Rutten points out that ‘knowledge 
workers are often professionally part of trans-regional (global) networks’ and they use 
temporary proximity and long-distance learning to maintain these networks.  These global 
professional networks no doubt play a crucial role in stretching individuals’ relational space 
and extending the spatial reach of their learning. But spatial reach (range) that enables access 
to new knowledge should not be conflated with social depth (cohesion) needed for its 
effective transfer and exploitation. Novel knowledge acquired by ‘range’ needs ‘cohesion’ in 
order to be exploited (Reagans and McEvily, 2003).  The integration of global spatial reach 
with local social depth is what is needed for learning and innovation in a globalizing 
knowledge economy.   Human mobility plays a critical role in this process: it enables 
individuals to remain knowledgeable over distance. 
While individuals are spatially sticky to their ‘homes’, they are also increasingly mobile 
within boundaryless regional and global labour markets. The managed global mobility of 
people has always been important for generating cognitive and relational proximity needed 
for the circulation of tacit knowledge within distributed corporate networks (Faulconbridge, 
2006).  More recently, the phenomenon of ‘brain circulation’ and transnational high-skilled 
migration (and remigration) (Saxenian, 2005; Kalerding, 2009) signifies the growth of free 
agent transnational mobility beyond the confines of firms’ organizational networks.  The 
‘astronauts’ shuttling back and forth between Taiwan’s Hsinchu region and Sillicon Valley, 
and the returnee entrepreneurs in China and India  (Saxenian and Hsu, 2001; Saxenian, 2005) 
are prominent examples of individuals who act as knowledge brokers by connecting learning 
in local places with knowledge resources drawn from global spaces. By virtue of their 
position at the intersection of multiple social contexts, these individuals possess a distinctive 
reflexive capacity and are able to disembed knowledge from one familiar location and 
reembed it in another familiar one (Williams, 2007). Furthermore, their cultural and social 
affinities to specific locations enable and motivate the effective transfer and exploitation of 
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knowledge. The relational embeddedness at home gives the returnees the competitive edge to 
serve as knowledge brokers and innovators, linking local tacit knowledge with novel ideas 
drawn from their diverse global networks.  
The example of transnational migrants serves to illustrate how people on the move and their 
cultural affinities to local nodes drive the socio-spatial dynamics of learning in a global 
knowledge economy.  It also reaffirms my earlier point that it is the tacitness of knowledge 
that privileges the individual as the principal agent of learning. 
 
Conclusion 
Parallel with the rise of a knowledge-based economy is the increased attention paid to 
individual learning and creativity among academic researchers, and their greater concerted 
effort to make the individual more visible in theories of learning and innovation which have 
hitherto been dominated by a collectivist orientation (e.g. Felin and Hesterly, 2007; Gupta et 
al., 2007). Rutten’s proposition is in line with this emerging stream of literature which seeks 
to reconcile the individual vs. collective, and agency vs. structure dilemma in innovation 
studies. His explication of the interaction between the individual, spatial stickiness and 
relational space adds an interesting dimension to the debate. However, the theoretical 
contribution of his proposition could be strengthened by more explicitly adopting the 
‘embedded agency’ argument in the Giddensian tradition (Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992).  At 
present, his individual-first perspective is ‘undersocialized’ and yet the agency element is 
only weakly developed. A more fine-grained explanation of how the properties of a social 
system of relationships enable and constrain individual learning, and how the overlapping 
and shifting of socio-spatial contexts create free cognitive space for learning and (new) 
knowledge creation will help to sharpen the theoretical stance proposed. 
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